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Summary
• The pre-eminent role of nationalized oil and gas resources in the six Gulf monarchies has 
resulted in a private sector that is highly dependent on the state. This has crucial implications 
for economic and political reform prospects.
• All the ruling families – from a variety of starting points – have themselves moved much more 
extensively into business activities over the past two decades.
• Meanwhile, the traditional business elites’ socio-political autonomy from the ruling families 
(and thus the state) has diminished throughout the Gulf region – albeit again from different 
starting points and to different degrees today.
• The business elites’ priority interest in securing and preserving benefits from the rentier state 
has led them to reinforce their role of supporter of the incumbent regimes and ruling families. 
In essence, to the extent that business elites in the Gulf engage in policy debate, it tends to be to 
protect their own privileges. This has been particularly evident since the 2011 Arab uprisings.
• The overwhelming dependence of these business elites on the state for revenues and contracts, 
and the state’s key role in the economy – through ruling family members’ personal involvement 
in business as well as the state’s dominant ownership of stocks in listed companies – means 
that the distinction between business and political elites in the Gulf monarchies has become 
increasingly blurred.
• Under current uncertain political and economic conditions, existing patterns of clientelism 
and the business sector’s dependence on the state will not undergo significant changes. In these 
circumstances, the business elites are unlikely to become drivers of political reform.
• In the context of persistently low oil prices, growing tensions related to the definition of the new 
social contract and the content of structural reforms in the Gulf monarchies are likely to provoke 
renewed popular frustrations and considerable turmoil.
Ruling Families and Business Elites in the Gulf Monarchies: Ever Closer?
3 | Chatham House
Introduction
For the six Gulf monarchies – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) – the sharp fall in world oil prices since 2014 has intensified debate regarding 
the need to rethink socio-economic structures in order to address challenges to social and political 
sustainability. This reassessment comes only a few years after the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings, in reaction 
to which these states spent extensively in implementing emergency economic and security measures 
to counter domestic and regional impact and to ensure the survival of the authoritarian order.
In the context of this questioning of the oil-rent model of development – a model on which these 
monarchies, which together make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have extensively relied 
since the 1950s, and which has underpinned the social contract – the issue of relations between 
the national business elites and the ruling families has never been so critical. This reflects both the 
decisive role that the business classes have had for decades in supporting the established order and 
shaping political legitimacy, and which they are expected to play in underpinning each GCC state’s 
new economic vision, in which business is viewed as the primary engine of economic growth and 
provider of employment for Gulf nationals.
This paper shows that a common evolution has been taking place across the GCC. For much of the 
20th century, a de facto ‘oligarchic’ pact linking the ruling families and the national business elites 
was central to the maintenance of the authoritarian status quo. Even if some variations could be 
seen in the nature of this state–business relationship from one GCC country to another, a common 
characteristic was that the economic pre-eminence of local business actors was recognized and 
protected, and the business elites were granted a large share of oil revenues in return for their support 
for the established order. But this informal understanding has undergone crucial changes over the 
past two decades, with the involvement of ruling families in business – from a variety of starting 
points – increasing dramatically in all countries. The paper examines the correlations and implications 
of the royals’ growing economic influence for the behaviours of the business elites in light of policies 
implemented, and their roles in this changing order. The increasing personal involvement of ruling 
family members in business in the Gulf monarchies is likely to have implications for the future 
legitimacy of these regimes. In particular, it will make large-scale austerity measures announced 
recently more difficult to justify, in a context of popular frustration regarding widening inequalities 
and increased concentration of wealth in the hands of a few.
The business elites’ history of political influence
Business communities in the Gulf monarchies have a long history of political influence. Prior 
to the rise of oil as the dominant economic driver (which across the Arabian Peninsula took place 
gradually from the 1930s, first in Bahrain and Kuwait, to the 1970s in Oman), domestic stability 
was underwritten by an arrangement that linked rulers with a number of prominent tribal leaders 
and local merchant families. The latter in particular helped meet the rulers’ financial needs, and in 
return received political influence and protection for their economic interests. Thus, the merchants, 
who controlled the two main economic sectors (pearling and trade), enjoyed not only personal 
proximity to the rulers – including through marriage alliances – but also the protection this closeness 
brought them. For the ruling families, the business elites were indispensable to the maintenance 
of the political status quo: not only did they provide liquid assets for each ruler, in the form of loans, 
but the ruler was able to deduct from these same business interests the taxes and custom duties 
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that represented the major sources of his revenue. This situation further increased the merchants’ 
political influence, their involvement in the day-to-day business of state (through the granting 
of decision-making positions), and, ultimately, their critical role in ensuring the ruler’s political 
survival. In the numerous instances of succession conflicts and quarrels within ruling families in 
the Gulf monarchies, both the ruler and any challengers to the throne were driven to forge alliances 
with business elites in order to assert their own authority within the ruling family, which in turn 
underpinned the influence of the business classes. This mutually beneficial alliance between 
merchants and rulers was disrupted by the sudden material self-sufficiency of the rulers after oil 
was discovered across the Peninsula and oil exports began. From this point, the state monopoly 
on managing expenditure and development allowed the creation of a welfare state which became 
the new cornerstone of the ruling families’ political legitimacy.
With the discovery and exploitation of oil reserves came the consolidation of the economic position the 
business elites occupied. The rulers assured them of privileged access to the oil windfall through public 
contracts in sectors dealing with infrastructure and urban planning (roads, public buildings, etc.), as 
well as by means of tough laws restricting the rights of foreign investors, so as to protect the national 
market. Through the kafil (sponsor) system, any foreign individual or company wishing to work in 
a GCC country has been obliged to associate with a local partner, who receives regular payment in 
return. As explained by Mohamed al-Rumaihi, in the case of Bahrain: ‘the granting of import licences 
and the setting up of agencies were rigidly controlled by the Government for the benefit of the big 
merchants. Any newcomer wishing to enter a particular field faced a monopoly situation which was 
almost impossible to break.’1 The effect was that wealth distributed to the population by the state 
in the form of salaries, social allowances or price subsidies was recouped by the long-serving allies of 
the rulers (the business elites in particular) through ownership of companies winning public contracts. 
This compromise – abdication of political influence in return for protection of business monopolistic 
positions – actually allowed the business elites to strengthen their economic and social pre-eminence 
by the conversion of trade dynasties to rent wealth.
There were variations in this general pattern from country to country. While in Kuwait and Oman 
the rulers promised to keep royal family members away from business activity, in Qatar – where the 
merchant community was weaker and smaller – the ruler allowed his relatives into the business elites’ 
economic territory. In the post-independence UAE, the ruling families of Abu Dhabi and Dubai were 
critically reliant on business expertise to build the new state. This favoured the commercial elites’ 
integration in political structures there, and further enhanced their proximity to the Al Nahyan and 
Al Maktoum dynasties – and thus their own stake in the preservation of the authoritarian order. In 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the business elites kept a firm grip over the economy until the mid-1970s, 
meanwhile using their personal proximity to senior members of the ruling families to act as informal 
advisers and thus ensure their interests and priorities were taken into account.
The ruling families’ increasing involvement in business
Across the Gulf monarchies, the relationship between the ruling family and business elites has 
experienced significant evolution over the past two decades. In particular, all the ruling families have 
moved much more extensively, and along a similar path, into business – albeit each at its own pace, 
depending on the historical balance of power between the two sets of interests. The first GCC country 
1 Al-Rumaihi, M.G. (1976), Bahrain: Social and Political Change since the First World War, London: Bowker, pp. 150–51.
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where this shift occurred was Bahrain. Rising oil revenues after 1973 and the suspension of the short-
lived parliament in 1975 drastically transformed the pre-independence oligarchic pact. The business 
elites’ economic role is now generally restricted to the one of subsidiary partner in projects decided 
and led by a few senior members of the Al Khalifa, who have become the country’s most prominent 
business actors. The real estate sector has been crucial in this evolution, as much of Bahrain’s most 
valuable land has been tightly controlled by the ruling family. Since the 2000s, an uncontrolled real 
estate boom has come to serve as a diversification policy in itself, with megaprojects on reclaimed 
lands – such as Bahrain Bay (in which the king is a partner)2 or Bahrain Financial Harbour (in which 
the prime minister is involved).3
The extent of the Saudi royals’ business activities increased dramatically from 
the 1990s, as the generation of princes born in the 1960s and the 1970s, whose 
prospects of accessing senior political positions were very limited, engaged 
themselves elsewhere.
In Abu Dhabi and Qatar too, ruling family members are in control of powerful companies that 
dominate the economy – either personally or through sovereign wealth funds. The large-scale 
involvement of royals in the economy came about earlier in Qatar (in the late 1980s) than in Abu Dhabi 
(in the early 2000s), but has since increased in both emirates. The economic weight of former Qatari 
prime minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani4 and several sons of the late UAE president Sheikh Zayed, 
including Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and UAE Deputy Prime Minister Mansour 
bin Zayed, illustrates this transition. Merchant elites are now subservient to the ruling families and are 
obliged to adapt to the latter’s business priorities. Among other positions, Mohammed bin Zayed chairs 
the government company Mubadala, regarded as his foremost investment vehicle.5 Mansour bin Zayed 
(who is married to Manal bint Mohammed bin Rashid, a daughter of the ruler of Dubai) chairs Abu 
Dhabi’s third largest wealth fund, the International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC),6 as well as 
the Emirates Investment Authority, the UAE federal government’s sole sovereign wealth fund. In addition 
to these government roles, Mansour bin Zayed controls holdings including the Abu Dhabi United Group 
for Development and Investment (which owns Manchester City Football Club) and DAS Holding.
In Saudi Arabia few royals – apart from Talal bin Abdulaziz, from the 1960s, and his son al-Waleed 
(Kingdom Holding) – were involved in business on a wider scale until the late 1980s. Among these are 
Mishaal bin Abdulaziz, the current chairman of the Allegiance Council and the founder of Al Shoula 
Group in 1970; Mohammed bin Fahd, a major partner in the Al Bilad conglomerate since the early 
1970s; Abdullah bin Faisal, who founded the Al Faisaliah Group in 1971; and his brother Mohammed, 
regarded as one of the pioneers of modern Islamic banking.
The extent of the Saudi royals’ business activities increased dramatically from the 1990s, as 
the generation of princes born in the 1960s and the 1970s, whose prospects of accessing senior 
2 O’Murchu, C. and Kerr, S. (2014), ‘Bahrain land deals highlight alchemy of making money from sand’, Financial Times, 10 December 2014, 
https://next.ft.com/content/b6d081a2-74b8-11e4-8321-00144feabdc0.
3 Richter, F. and De Sa’Pinto, M. (2011), ‘Special Report: In Bahrain, a symbol at the heart of revolt’, Reuters, 17 June 2011, http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-bahrain-gfh-idUSTRE75F4LF20110617.
4 Of a total wealth estimated at some US $1.2 billion, he owns $700 million worth of public stock in Deutsche Bank, through his investment vehicle 
Paramount Services Holdings.
5 Gulf States News (2015), GSN 1,000: Transformation and trepidation in the Gulf monarchies, 17 September 2015, p. 43. Mubadala owns stakes in 
the Carlyle Group, a US private equity company, Piaggio Aerospace, General Electric, etc.
6 In June 2016 Mohammed bin Zayed announced the creation of a committee, to be chaired by his brother Mansour, charged with the 
responsibility of merging Mubadala and IPIC.
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political positions were very limited, engaged themselves elsewhere. Among the most prominent 
business royals who emerged this time are Hussam bin Saud (Saudi-Kuwait Holding, Zain), 
Abdulaziz bin Ahmed (Atheeb), Ahmed and Faisal bin Salman (Saudi Research and Marketing 
Group), Abdulaziz bin Fahd (MBC, Al Arabiya) and Khalid bin Sultan (al-Hayat newspaper, Al Raha 
Group for Technical Services). Subsequently, from the 2000s, a very large number of Abdulaziz’s 
younger grandchildren and great-grandchildren have entered business, including Khalid bin Bandar 
bin Sultan (Dayim), Turki bin Abdulrahman (Modern Group), Abdulaziz bin Mitab (Kanooz), 
Abdulaziz bin Sattam (BT Al Saudia), and Faisal and Turki bin Muqrin (Saudi Development 
and Training Company).
In Kuwait and Oman, where for a long period the business families were sufficiently strong to keep 
the ruling family out of their domain, royals have more recently entered business. In the case of 
Kuwait, the children and grandchildren of the current ruler, Sabah Al Ahmed, have become key 
actors in the economy. Prominent among these are Nasser Sabah (Al-Futooh Holding and Kuwait 
Enterprises Holding) and his brother Hamad (chairman of the holding company KIPCO, which has 
consolidated assets of some US $32 billion, and on the board of which two of Nasser’s sons also sit). 
They and other members of the ruling family, including the former emir’s daughter Hussa bint Saad 
(chair of the Arab Businesswomen’s Council and a board member of Ithmaar Bank), are only a few 
examples of the growing presence of the Al Sabah’s in the private sector.
In Oman the involvement of the ruling family in economic affairs has been evident since the mid-2000s. 
Notably, three sons of Sultan Qaboos’ paternal uncle Tariq bin Taimur – who in the absence of a named 
heir are the more probable candidates for the eventual succession to Qaboos – have prominent business 
roles. Asad bin Tariq, the sultan’s personal representative, has been chairing the board of trustees of the 
University of Nizwa, Oman’s largest private university; and also heads Asad Investment Company, which 
controls more than US $1 billion in assets worldwide.7 Asad’s half-brother Haitham, the minister of 
national heritage and culture and chair of the committee responsible for drafting Oman Vision 2040, the 
country’s long-term national strategy, controls his own holding company, National Trading. Haitham’s 
full brother Shihab chairs the Seven Seas group, which has investments worldwide in petroleum, mutual 
funds and medical supplies. Sultan Qaboos’s maternal uncle, Mustahil al-Ma‘ashani, has chaired Muscat 
Overseas holding, the most active business group in Dhofar. Mustahil’s son Khalid chairs the first Omani 
banking group, Bank Muscat, and Dhofar International Development and Investment Company, which 
is the main shareholder of the second largest Omani bank (Bank Dhofar).
The business elites: simply following the ruling families?
The private sector in all GCC states has for many years been highly state-dependent, with business 
activity closely linked to direct and indirect distribution of government wealth. State contracts have 
been one of the most substantial sources of enrichment for business actors, which have also relied on 
government bailouts at times of financial difficulty. At the same time, each state’s distribution policies 
towards the wider population have maintained high levels of consumption, and this has been to the great 
benefit of local businesses – not least through the ownership of companies awarded public contracts. 
Indeed, the dependence of the local private sector on the state has increased since the end of the 2000s, 
as shown by the overall pattern of growth in the public sector’s share in total investment among the Gulf 
monarchies. For the GCC overall, the public sector accounted for an average of 39.7 per cent of gross 
7 Asad’s son Taimur has been chairman of Alizz Bank, Oman’s second Islamic bank, since 2012.
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fixed capital formation in 2009–14, compared with 32.6 per cent in 2003–08. The rate of increase was 
particularly notable in Bahrain (from 19.6 per cent in 2003–08 to 30.0 per cent in 2009–14), Kuwait 
(from 22.3 per cent to 34.1 per cent) and Saudi Arabia (from 35.4 per cent to 47.4 per cent), while the 
largest share (57.3 per cent in the latter period, up from 49.5 per cent) was in Oman. The exception to the 
trend was the UAE, where the share declined from 35.5 per cent in 2003–08 to 31.5 per cent in 2009–14.8
Despite some shift in the composition of business elites and the emergence of new business 
actors, the oil-based power balance remains intact. Naturally, the protection and expansion of 
the associated privileges has been of paramount interest to the GCC business elites, and has largely 
defined its engagement in political discourse. Even in the rare instances of ‘new money’ disrupting 
the monopolies of the old business elite families – examples being Esam Jinahi in Bahrain, or 
Mahmoud Haidar in Kuwait, who have been considered as being among the GCC’s most influential 
economic figures since the early 2000s – it is only with the patronage of, or in partnership with, royals 
who are themselves involved in business that these could rise to become prominent economic actors. 
Traditional merchant families have been successful in maintaining very high barriers of entry into the 
business community, thereby preventing newcomers from threatening their monopolies and resisting 
the nationalization of the workforce. Thus, established businesses contribute relatively little to 
support small and medium-sized enterprises and new private-sector interests in general.
The capacity of the business sector to engage in politics in the Gulf monarchies depends on 
historical relations between ruler and merchant class; on the presence of institutions through 
which business interests can formally participate (indeed the parliament in Kuwait has provided 
an important platform for the merchants’ political engagement since the independence); and on the 
extent to which the political field is monopolized by the ruling family. In Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
formal political engagement by business has been limited, constrained by the dominance of royal 
family members in top government positions. Thus, merchants’ interests there have been pursued 
mainly through lobbying bodies such as chambers of commerce and industry, and through informal 
connections with ruling family members. Business interests in Qatar and the UAE are to a large extent 
protected by the close interconnection of often indistinguishable economic and political elites. The 
situation in Oman and Kuwait, however, is appreciably different. Business actors in both states have 
been directly involved in formal politics, occupying key government positions as well as – in the case 
of Kuwait – engaging in parliamentary politics.
The engagement of Gulf business interests in politics has not necessarily been uncontentious. 
Indeed, business actors have at times made use of both formal and informal channels to challenge 
government policies that potentially compromise their critical economic interests. In Bahrain in 
2008–09, for example, business owners openly lobbied the prime minister in protest against efforts 
by the Economic Development Board – a body headed by the crown prince – to introduce labour 
market reforms, and the measures were in the end watered down. In Kuwait, notably, some of the 
country’s most prominent business figures allied themselves with the opposition movement in 
2011–12 against alleged corruption at government level. In Qatar there has been strong opposition 
from much of the private sector, including from business royals, to the cautious reform of the 
sponsorship system that is scheduled to enter effect in December 2016. There has been a similar 
pattern elsewhere in the Gulf; even in the UAE, where a model of free zones has been developed, 
the law outside the free zones requires that a company must be majority-owned by nationals.
8 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2015), World Investment Report 2015, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
wir2015_en.pdf, p. 55, Table II.5.
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Across the Gulf monarchies, however, the business community’s critical reliance on state largesse 
has made it wary of political confrontation, as the stability of the incumbent regimes ensures the 
continued flow of rents to the private sector. Therefore, the trend across the Gulf following the Arab 
uprisings has been towards a closer alliance between business and ruling powers, with merchants 
representing the regimes’ strongest supporters. In Bahrain the vast majority of the private sector 
openly supported the hardline prime minister against opposition protests in 2011–12 – a notable 
exception being Faisal Jawad, chief executive of the long-established Jawad Business Group (JBG), 
whose perceived sympathy with some protesters made his businesses targets for boycotts and 
vandalism.9 In Oman perceived conflicts of interests and alleged corruption resulting from direct 
involvement of business leaders in government were among protesters’ main grievances in 2011. 
While a cabinet reshuffle was subsequently implemented, this did not profoundly restrict the 
merchants’ access to political decision-making, and popular resentment of business elites persists. 
In Kuwait the opposition-dominated parliament in the second half of the 2000s had attempted to 
tackle the interests of the private-sector elite head-on. For instance, it opposed government measures 
intended to bail out businesses affected by the 2008 financial crisis, pushing instead for the government 
to drop consumers’ debts; it also blocked several megaprojects, such as the planned new Al-Zour 
refinery and a joint Dow Chemical deal at the end of 2008, and questioned the legality of the Kuwait 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This prompted members of the business community generally – 
even those figures who had previously supported the opposition movement – to realign themselves 
with the ruling powers in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. The merchants were confirmed as the 
main supporting pillar of the regime after legislative elections in 2013, and for this they were rewarded 
economically. Kuwait’s new parliament – which, after a large-scale boycott of the polls, lacked any 
prominent opposition representation – swiftly approved a US $130 billion five-year development plan 
for the period 2015–20; this had a particular focus on the implementation of multiple infrastructure 
projects and enhanced public-private partnerships, thereby opening large-scale opportunities for 
the local business sector. Many new schemes were launched, and a number of suspended projects, 
including the Al-Zour refinery, were revived.
At present, the governments of Qatar and the UAE are still able to continue 
providing roughly the same level of welfare to their people, but those countries 
with a larger population (Saudi Arabia) or fewer resources (Oman and Bahrain) 
are faced with a much more urgent dilemma of distribution.
Thus, their primary interest in retaining privileged benefits from the rentier state has pushed the 
region’s business elites to strengthen their support for the incumbent regimes across the Gulf, and 
to act as committed proponents of the political status quo that guarantees and secures their economic 
benefits. Such opposition to reform, combined with the business community’s ability to influence the 
political discourse in favour of its own interests, underlies the growing antagonism observed among 
the wider population towards these elites across the region. The wide socio-economic disparities 
between the established business community – together with the ruling powers that this community 
supports – and the less privileged and more numerous sections of each Gulf monarchy’s population 
have been thrown into sharp relief, with increasing resentment on the part of the latter that they 
9 JBG was established in the 1950s. On a number of occasions from 2011 JBG premises were reportedly vandalized by pro-regime activists 
(see for example Abu-Nasr, D. (2012), ‘Torched Bank Warns Formula One Racing into Bahrain Violence’, Bloomberg, 19 April 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-18/torched-bank-forewarns-formula-one-racing-into-bahrain-violence), and state-led 
campaigns were organized to encourage boycotts of JBG products.
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are getting only the crumbs of a cake that business elites and ruling powers are dividing between 
themselves. The situation is aggravated by the distinct structural autonomy of the private sector, 
which is not required to contribute to the benefit of the population as a whole by paying taxes or 
by providing sufficient employment. In the context of financial pressure arising from low world oil 
prices, the competition for state resources has intensified. At present, the governments of Qatar and 
the UAE are still able to continue providing roughly the same level of welfare to their people, but 
those countries with a larger population (Saudi Arabia) or fewer resources (Oman and Bahrain) 
are faced with a much more urgent dilemma of distribution.
The state and business: neither separate nor united
Given the multiple commercial and familial linkages between merchants and entrepreneurs on 
one side, and royals on the other, divisions between ‘business’ and ‘state’ are now arguably more 
conceptual than actual. Furthermore, family and clan dynamics are often highly influential in shaping 
interactions between commercial interests and the state – and specifically the ruling family. These 
interrelationships occur within and between concentric circles of power and influence in the Gulf 
monarchies, beginning with a small core of political and economic decision-makers and extending 
outwards to the various layers of society. Through this process, the erosion of the private sector’s 
autonomy in favour of the interests of the centralized rentier state is further accentuated by the 
multiple and overlapping clientelistic networks and linkages connecting society and state.
State–business relations in the Gulf are thus characterized by three principal features. First, rent 
revenues have enabled the state to ensure the dependence of the private sector through mechanisms 
such as significant stock ownership in major businesses, the awarding of lucrative contracts, and 
financial reward through membership of multiple corporate boards. Second, family lineage and 
clan history play important roles in both state–business and business–business ties, drawing groups 
that may otherwise be excluded closer into the social and economic mainstream – and, more 
significantly, into the orbit of the state. Third, family and business relationships, sometimes separately 
and sometimes in conjunction with one another, serve as nodes of contact and interconnection 
between the inner reaches of the state and other circles of society from the centre outwards. These 
three features have made the business community heavily dependent on the state for its continued 
well-being and growth – especially in periods of economic downturn or slowdown.
Key is the significance of family ties and their juxtaposition with prevailing patterns of interaction both 
within the private sector and between the private sector and the state. The prominence of family ties in 
state–business and business–business relationships is evident throughout the Gulf. In Abu Dhabi, for 
example, much as in Qatar, about a dozen business families have been able to link wide-ranging social, 
economic and political interests with those of the ruling family, and have therefore been favoured over 
others. Business and merchant elites also have a strong presence on the boards of most state-owned and 
state-dominated enterprises, perpetuating close links with the state and fostering mutual interests and 
trust between the state and business elites, as well as underwriting ruler legitimacy. In the UAE, Qatar 
and Kuwait in particular, this interdependence of interests between ruling family and business elites 
has frequently been ratified by marriage alliances. A recent illustration is the high-profile marriage, in 
2015, between the emir of Kuwait’s grandson and the granddaughter of prominent businessman Jassim 
al-Khorafi, who was speaker of the parliament from 1999–2011. Such intermarriages with non-royals 
are much less common in Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia.
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The patterns that can be traced in state–business relations in the Gulf are illustrative of the ways 
in which rentier political economies have evolved in countries where social dynamics have been 
strengthened in the face of – or indeed because of – the extensive reach of the state and its institutions. 
Efforts to capture and perpetuate rents have built on and reinforced prevailing social dynamics, one of 
the most important of which revolves around the extended family. Rentierism has thus helped blur the 
lines between the state and the private sector, and has encouraged the expansion of the phenomenon 
of brokerage among privileged locals, who know how to capitalize on their insider knowledge and 
their access to the innermost circles at which decisions are made.
These factors combine to make the private sector not just a client of the state, but one of its 
main sources of support. By serving as a critical link between the epicentre of power and successive 
social strata, the private sector underpins state authority. For its part, by virtue of its intimate and 
multidimensional ties to the state, the local business community in the GCC has in many ways become 
an extension of the public sector. At the very least, it has evolved as one of the state’s main clients 
and one of its strongest social allies.
Structural obstacles towards meaningful reforms
For the GCC states since 2011, as elsewhere in the Arab world, demands for social and economic 
reforms have been at the top of the agenda of critics of the incumbent regimes, with a particular 
focus on job opportunities and proactive measures to curb rising inequalities and to counter alleged 
corruption among senior officials. While distribution of state wealth – in the form of free healthcare, 
free education and public-sector jobs for nationals – has been a key pillar of the system’s legitimacy, 
demands for change among the region’s youth have apparently been fuelled by resentment at an elite 
that they perceive to be busily safeguarding its privileges, together with a growing disparity between 
the fortunate few, who benefit greatly from economic spin-offs, and the vast majority, who do so 
much less, if at all. The increasing personal involvement of ruling family members in business is likely 
to fuel such frustration. This is likely to extend even to Qatar and the UAE, which have thus far been 
partially shielded by a more comfortable balance of demand against resources, as these regimes, too, 
begin to attenuate the extent of their welfare states. Open to debate now is the future loyalty of the 
wider population to a system that, despite its imperfections, was for many years capable of providing 
a minimum level of economic security to almost all Gulf nationals, but which latterly has moved 
towards an increasingly self-interested model of rent capture by a small elite.
At a time of political and economic uncertainty, loyalty to the system still is the most rational choice 
for the business elites, even if their privileges tend to be squeezed. The current close alliance between 
business elites and ruling powers reflects the former’s quest to preserve its interests in the wake of 
the Arab uprisings. This dynamic confirms that the private sector in the Gulf monarchies cannot be 
seen as a driver of political reform. Rather, the region’s business classes are likely to seek to preserve 
the political status quo, while utilizing their position as a buttress of the incumbent regimes to push 
for economic policies that are in line with business interests but that will not necessarily benefit 
the broader population that is predominantly dependent on the public sector. Offsetting its state 
dependence would require new sources of rent for the business sector, and, more specifically, new 
contracts without or with reduced government support. As long as the state controls the flow of oil 
and gas revenues, it remains the primary awarder of contracts for the infrastructure growth and 
development through which the business sector thrives.
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While there may be a prima facie logic in assuming that increasing the contribution of the private 
sector to growth will make it more autonomous, this remains purely theoretical and does not take 
account of the specific structure and practices of the business sector in the Gulf. At least as far as 
the state’s relationship with the business community is concerned, existing patterns of close ties, 
clientelism and the business sector’s dependence on the state are unlikely to undergo significant 
changes, even if the state has fewer resources to distribute.
The growing involvement of royals in business may be considered as a ruler’s 
response to the problem of how to control his own expanding family.
Even the impact of a new generation of independent young entrepreneurs remains hypothetical. 
When, in the GCC monarchies, new business actors are not simply created in the interests of an 
incumbent regime – i.e. through royal patronage – policies promoting entrepreneurship and innovation 
have tended to function as another vehicle for state patronage. Crystal Ennis, with reference to Oman 
and Qatar, has noted: ‘Managed in a certain way, [the promotion of entrepreneurship] can prove to 
have a minimal political cost and still maintain the appearance of addressing major socio-economic 
problems … If the promotion of entrepreneurship is accomplishing anything, it is slightly extending 
the boundaries of rent circulation by allowing newer actors to become recipients’;10 in the end, the 
status quo is perpetuated.
The growing involvement of royals in business may be considered as a ruler’s response to the 
problem of how to control his own expanding family. More and more individuals and branches of 
each ruling family understand that their chances of accessing the throne, or even of attaining senior 
political positions, are vanishingly small. In this context, a ‘safety valve’ may be to incite family 
members to choose money over political ambition – a bargain comparable to the one that prevailed 
between rulers and merchants after oil was discovered. However, this strategy may well revive 
internal tensions within the ruling families themselves, since the economic weight of an individual 
or a branch of the family is likely also to increase their political weight. Economic assets are political 
resources that royals involved in business will be tempted to use in order to secure power and 
influence within the family.
It is also important to consider the conflict between political and economic interests at the highest 
levels in the Gulf monarchies. Each of the ruling families will increasingly be required to manage 
competing priorities between the national general interests that they are supposed to promote – 
through implementing measures to address local youth unemployment, or by means of nationalization 
policies for jobs in the private sector, etc. – and the particular stakes that some of ruling family 
members now defend as business actors. This will have an impact on the direction taken through 
economic policies, since, for example, labour market reforms favouring nationals are usually at odds 
with policies enhancing incentives for businesses, or those favouring deregulation and privatization. 
Furthermore it may also fuel divisions between the royals interested in power politics and those 
motivated by more entrepreneurial interests.
10 Ennis, C. (2015), ‘Between Trend and Necessity: Top-Down Entrepreneurship Promotion in Oman and Qatar’, The Muslim World, 105 (1), 
pp. 116 and 129.
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Conclusions
Since 2014 GCC governments have each responded to lower world oil prices by means of a similar 
sets of measures announced with great fanfare, including: promotion of private-sector growth 
through enhanced incentives for businesses and foreign direct investment; reductions in state 
subsidies and government spending; implementation of labour market reforms, including some 
tentative amendments to the sponsorship system; privatization of some state-owned enterprises, 
health and education services and other government facilities (such as electricity, transport and 
water provision); and increased taxation, beginning with the introduction of value-added tax (VAT). 
While some of these strategies stand out for their comprehensiveness – as in the case of Saudi Arabia’s 
Vision 2030 – more often such adjustments are arguably a case of déjà vu.11 Diversification has been 
the stated economic policy of all the Gulf monarchies since at least the 1970s. Furthermore, earlier 
such plans (Bahrain’s Economic Vision 2030, Abu Dhabi’s Economic Vision 2030 and Qatar National 
Vision 2030, all launched in 2008, and Kuwait Vision 2035, inaugurated in 2010), usually inspired 
by the same source,12 have either not been fully implemented, as some of the political and social costs 
have been regarded as too problematic, or have resulted in increased inequalities and concentration 
of wealth in the hands of a few, thus further stoking popular frustration – as observed in Bahrain and 
Oman in 2011 (and more generally across the Middle East). In the current context, there is no reason 
why similar measures – i.e. the privatization of education and health services, and the introduction 
of regressive taxes disproportionately impacting the poorer sectors of society (in the form of VAT) – 
would not be expected to produce similar social and economic impacts.
Given this track record, there are reasons to take a circumspect approach towards the recent 
reform plans, especially in the context of the fundamentally competing demands of the Gulf 
monarchies’ business elites – including royals – and ordinary people who would rather see 
businesses taxed than personal incomes. In particular, the structural rivalry between the business 
elites and the wider population means that it is increasingly difficult for the government to promote 
and justify large-scale austerity measures, for the sake of sustainable development, while merchant 
and royal elites preserve their own privileges and a secured flow of rents. True, mounting internal 
pressures and increased contestation of the established order has been a source of growing anxiety 
among the region’s ruling families, particularly since 2011. However, rather than rulers seizing 
the opportunity to promote a new social contract that would offer a more equitable distribution of 
wealth from natural resources and a more participatory decision-making process, the experience of 
the past decade points in the direction of a deepening concentration of wealth and power, and the 
evidence would suggest that no scenario of inclusive reform is on the horizon.13 Indeed, if the Gulf 
monarchies do pursue the top-down, neo-liberal reforms that have been announced, these are likely 
to foster tensions related to the definition of the new social contract. They could provoke renewed 
frustrations among the people most affected and herald considerable medium-term turmoil, 
albeit to different degrees in the six monarchies.
11 Kinninmont, J. (2016), ‘Saudi Arabia Faces its Future in Vision 2030 Reform Plan’, Chatham House Expert Comment, 29 April 2016, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/saudi-arabia-faces-its-future-vision-2030-reform-plan#.
12 Saif, S. (2016), ‘When Consultants Reign’, Jacobin, 9 May 2016, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/05/saudi-arabia-aramco-salman-
mckinsey-privatization/.
13 Kinninmont, J. (2015), Future Trends in the Gulf, Chatham House Report, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150218FutureTrendsGCCKinninmont.pdf.
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